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Abstract 
We develop a model of immigrant political action that connects individual motivations to 
become politically involved with the context in which participation takes place. The paper posits 
that opinion climates in the form of hostility or openness toward immigrants shape the 
opportunity structure for immigrant political engagement by contributing to the social costs and 
political benefits of participation. We argue that friendly opinion climates toward immigrants 
enable political action among immigrants, and facilitate the politicization of political discontent. 
Using survey data from the European Social Survey (ESS) 2002-10 in 25 European democracies, 
our analyses reveal that more positive opinion climates – both at the level of countries and 
regions – increase immigrant political engagement, especially among immigrants dissatisfied 
with the political system. However, this effect is limited to uninstitutionalized political action, as 
opinion climates have no observable impact on participation in institutionalized politics.  
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International migration has manifold, complex, and profound effects on the migrants as 
well as migrant sending and receiving countries. In Europe as elsewhere, one important issue in 
debates on immigration has been whether immigrants do or should have opportunities to express 
their views and how they make use of these opportunities. To date, however, we have little 
systematic research on what encourages migrants to engage in political action and the role that 
host country’s environment plays in this respect.   
 This paper develops a model of immigrant political action that connects individual 
motivations to become politically involved with the socio-political context in which political 
participation takes place. We posit that a country’s opinion climate in the form of hostility or 
openness toward immigrants is a critical determinant of immigrant political engagement. 
Specifically, a friendly opinion climate is an important stimulant of immigrant participation in 
two ways: first, openness toward immigrants reduces the social costs of political action among 
immigrants and enhances their perception that political action will be acceptable and efficacious; 
second, in reducing the social costs of participation, a positive opinion climate facilitates the 
translation of political discontent into political engagement among immigrants.  
 We test these arguments using cross-national and individual-level data from the 
European Social Survey (ESS) collected in 25 European democracies 2002-10. Our analyses 
reveal that more positive opinion climates towards immigrants increase foreigners’ political 
engagement, and this effect is particularly strong among those who are dissatisfied with the 
political system. However, the effect is limited to uninstitutionalized political action, as the 
opinion climate has no observable impact on participation in institutionalized politics.  
Our paper contributes to research on anti-immigrant attitudes and immigrant political 
participation in several ways. First, on a theoretical level, we highlight the critical and complex 
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role that the socio-political context in the form of public opinion towards immigrants plays in 
shaping immigrant political engagement. In doing so, we go beyond existing research on formal 
institutions and political actors and investigate a central, but hitherto under-examined aspect of 
the broader social environment – captured at both national and regional levels – that shapes 
immigrant political engagement. Second, we seek to combine the study of anti-immigrant 
opinion with the study of immigrant political participation by considering anti-immigrant 
attitudes as a key independent, rather than dependent, variable. Third, by distinguishing 
theoretically and empirically between different types of political acts, we extend the scholarly 
focus beyond electoral participation – a type of participation many immigrants are not entitled to 
– and develop a more comprehensive view of the role that socio-political context and individual-
level determinants play in shaping immigrant political engagement. Finally, our analysis goes 
beyond the most heavily studied case of immigrant participation – the United States – and puts 
existing arguments to a test against a varied and extensive sample of European nations with 
diverse immigrant populations. 
Macro Context and Political Participation 
 While the social and political environment has long been known to systematically shape 
people’s political engagement (Huckfeldt, 1986; Zuckerman, 2005),1 most existing research 
focuses on the consequences of individual characteristics and the immediate political 
environment. Few studies have considered how the wider political community, or macro socio-
political context, influences people’s political engagement. This is perhaps not surprising, given 
that most studies of political participation have been conducted in single-country settings where 
the macro
 3 
 
The use of a single-country design has two important drawbacks, however: for one, it is 
difficult to establish whether the individual-level factors that drive political behavior in one 
country also play a role in other countries. It is easy to imagine that such factors may have 
dissimilar effects on individuals exposed to different political, social, and cultural contexts. But 
more importantly for the purpose of this analysis, single-country studies cannot systematically 
assess the consequences of countries’ macro environment for people’s political engagement.  
Within the literature on immigrants, researchers have argued that standard explanations 
of political behavior, such as the socio-economic model, are helpful but insufficient for 
understanding immigrant political behavior (Ramakrishnan, 2005; Cho, Gimpel, & Wu, 2006). 
This is because being an immigrant means having a set of experiences with both country of 
origin and host country (e.g. White et al., 2008; Fennema & Tillie, 1999; Portes & Rumbaut, 
2006). However, little systematic cross-national research exists on the consequences of socio-
political environment for immigrant political action due to the fact that most studies focus on 
only one or few countries (or cities) in their analyses. 
The general question we seek to answer below, then, is how immigrants’ exposure to 
their environment, measured at the levels of countries and regions, affects the patterns of 
immigrants’ political engagement. Specifically, does hostility towards immigrants breed political 
mobilization or apathy among foreigners? And do opinion climates affect various participatory 
acts differently? We contend that opinion climates matter to immigrants’ engagement in politics 
and the reasons have to do both with the costs and benefits of political action. 
Opinion Climates and Immigrant Political Action 
It has been long known that people’s political ideas, attitudes, and behaviors are 
influenced by their perceptions of what others do or think (Cooley, 1956; Mutz, 1998). 
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Individuals constantly (and to a large extent unconsciously) scan their environment in order to 
assess which opinions the majority may come to favor and which ones might lead to social 
exclusion (Scheufele & Moy, 2000). In her classic work on the spiral of silence Noelle-Neumann 
(1974, 1993) argued that people become less likely to express their political views as they 
perceive themselves to occupy a more extreme minority position in the population (see also 
Glynn, Hayes & Shanahan, 1997). Consistent with this perspective, a number of studies have 
shown that opinion polls affect voter turnout and vote choice (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1994; 
Atkin, 1969; de Bock, 1976; Lavrakas, Holley, & Miller, 1991; Skalaban, 1988; West, 1991), 
and that electoral behavior is sensitive to exit polls and early election returns (Sudman, 1986; 
Delli Carpini, 1984) as well as voters’ perceptions of the popularity of the candidates (Bartels, 
1988).  
Related research on social psychology reveals that individuals who belong to subordinate 
or less powerful groups are significantly more attuned to their environment and pay more 
attention to shifts even in the affective and nonverbal tone of dominant group members 
(Oyserman & Swim, 2001; Hall & Briton, 1993; Frable, 1997). Since immigrants perceive 
themselves to be in an inferior and stigmatized social position due to their outsider status in their 
host societies, we expect them to be especially sensitive to the social environment with important 
consequences for their political behavior.  
We conceptualize the political climate that people experience as a social constraint that 
increases the costs of political participation. Such costs come in the form of the actual or 
perceived social acceptability of expressing a minority opinion and the consequences this entails 
(Muller & Opp, 1986; Opp, 1986). High social costs discourage immigrant political engagement 
whereas reduced costs create incentives for political mobilization. We argue that immigrants are 
 5 
 
more likely to engage politically if they feel appreciated and welcomed by the native 
populations. In contrast, perceptions of hostility and stigmatized social status are likely to 
increase the social costs of participation, resulting in lower levels of participation. 
By conceptualizing a country’s opinion climate as a social constraint, we define it as 
separate from a country’s formal institutions or policies. However, thinking of it as a constraint 
allows us to interpret opinion climates within the framework of a country’s political opportunity 
structure. Political opportunities – a concept developed most prominently in the literature on 
social movements – refer to “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions 
of the political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s 
expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1998: 76-77; Eisinger, 1973; Tilly, 1978; Kitschelt, 
1986; Kriesi et al., 1995; McAdam, 1982, 1996). While political opportunities do not inevitably 
produce social movements, they often provide individuals with political grievances strong 
incentives for political mobilization.2 This is because favorable political opportunities increase 
the chances that even weak and less assertive movements will succeed (Amenta, 2005; Amenta, 
Carruthers, & Zylan, 1992; Amenta et al., 1994; Kitschelt, 1986; Costain, 1992; Soule et al., 
1999; Giugni, 2007).  
Most scholars of social movements focus on formal state institutions and elite alignments 
to conceptualize and measure a country’s or region’s political opportunity structure (McAdam, 
McCarthy, & Zald, 1996; McAdam, 1996). In line with this tradition, researchers of immigrant 
political engagement have argued that a country’s legal and institutional framework – 
particularly citizenship and residency laws – as well as political parties, trade unions, and other 
interest groups supportive of migration create opportunities for newcomers’ political engagement 
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(Ireland, 1994, 2000; Koopmans et al., 2005; Koopmans & Statham, 2000; Statham, 1999; 
Koopmans, 1999, 2004; Togeby, 1999; Soininen, 1999). 
Though less commonly, informal features of the political opportunity structure have also 
been employed in previous research. For example, Gamson and Meyer (1996) consider the 
public opinion climate – or what they refer to as the cultural climate, zeitgeist, or national mood 
– as an important element of the political opportunity structure for the emergence and success of 
social movements. Scholars of women’s movements argued that public opinion towards gender 
equality is part of the “gendered opportunity structure” that played an important role in women’s 
movements’ efforts to achieve their policy goals (Soule & Olzak, 2004). Similarly, public 
discourse on migration and ethnic relations in printed media has been treated as an indicator of 
the political opportunity structure for immigrant claim-making in several European countries and 
cities (Koopmans, 2004; Cinalli & Giugni, 2011).  
Because the various elements that constitute a country’s political opportunity structure 
act as external constraints to political action (Kitschelt, 1986; Tarrow, 1998), we expect that 
foreigners are more likely to engage in collective action if they perceive their political 
environment to be favorable to their concerns – that is, if the goals of participation are more 
likely to be realized. Thus, countries that provide more opportunities for immigrants to express 
their grievances and to contribute to collective policy decision-making are likely to have more 
politically involved foreigners. In contrast, states that are hostile or closed to the expression of 
immigrants’ concerns are more likely to produce apathetic and alienated immigrants, whose 
grievances might occasionally manifest through violence or crime among poor immigrants, and 
the return home or further migration to another location among highly-skilled foreigners. 
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While the opportunity structure perspective suggests that openness begets immigrant 
engagement in politics, several single-country studies show that migrant mobilization often takes 
place under threatening circumstances. In the U.S., for example, anti-immigrant legislation in the 
mid-1990s, which sought to restrict immigrant access to welfare benefits, had a positive impact 
on voting turnout among first- and second-generation immigrants (Ramakrishnan & Espenshade, 
2001, Pantoja, Ramirez, & Segura, 2001; Ramakrishnan, 2005, esp. Ch. 6). More recently, a 
study of Arab Americans in the aftermath of 9/11 reported that perceptions of threat associated 
with the Patriot Act legislation and incidents of racially motivated discrimination and violence 
significantly increased voter registration among more educated Arab immigrants (Cho, Gimpel, 
& Wu, 2006). Similarly in France, the political mobilization of black Africans has been 
attributed primarily to their efforts to defend housing rights (Péchu, 1999), while in Belgium 
immigrant groups mobilized and rallied fiercely for their enfranchisement in response to growing 
anti-immigrant sentiment in electoral competition (Jacobs, 1999). 
The two apparently contrasting perspectives – that hostility towards immigrants can 
mobilize or demobilize immigrant political action – may not be incompatible, however. After all, 
as Goldstone and Tilly (2001) point out, threat cannot be treated merely as a flip side of 
opportunity since increased threat does not always mean fewer opportunities.3 In other words, 
perceptions of threat to one’s rights or entitlements – or dissatisfaction with the political process 
more generally – are likely to have a different effect on political mobilization depending on the 
existing political opportunity structures. As a result, we expect that dissatisfaction with the 
political process is more likely to translate into political action under conditions of favorable 
opportunity structure, whereas political frustrations are likely to remain unexpressed in an 
environment of closed or restricted opportunities. Put differently, the political opportunity 
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structure should be particularly important in mobilizing immigrants for political action if it is 
connected to the expression of political discontent. This expectation is consistent with Tarrow’s 
argument that “the concept of political opportunity structure emphasizes resources external to the 
group. Unlike money or power, these can be taken advantage of by even weak or disorganized 
challengers … Contentious politics emerges when ordinary citizens … respond to opportunities 
that lower the costs of collective action, reveal potential allies, show were elites and authorities 
are most vulnerable, and trigger social networks and collective identities into action …” (Tarrow, 
1998: 20).  
Welcoming environments should therefore encourage migrants to engage in politics, in 
particular because members of minority groups, such as immigrants, are more likely to become 
inhibited in expressing themselves and engaging in politics as the spiral of silence theory 
suggests (Scheufele & Moy, 2000; Noelle-Neumann, 1993). We therefore hypothesize that the 
macro-social context in the form of a country’s opinion climate toward immigrants will have a 
contingent effect on political participation. Specifically, positive opinion climates towards 
immigrants should increase political participation among foreigners, but more powerfully among 
those with political grievances.  
Opinion Climates, Discontent, and Varieties of Political Action 
While early studies of political participation in democracies focused mostly on 
understanding standard modes of political engagement, such as electoral participation, the scope 
of inquiry into political engagement widened considerably in the aftermath of popular unrest 
during the 1960s and 1970s, as researchers began to take into account a broader repertoire of 
political acts, including protest behavior. This expansion of the empirical terrain considered by 
behavioral researchers brought with it the conceptual distinction between the traditional 
 9 
 
conventional, institutionalized acts of participation on one hand, and unconventional, 
uninstitutionalized, action on the other (Barnes et al., 1979; Muller, 1979). Institutionalized 
action is defined as involving routine political acts (mostly) oriented toward electoral processes, 
while uninstitutionalized participation is conceptualized as occurring outside of electoral politics 
and involving often more spontaneous, episodic, and disruptive political acts (Kaase, 1989). 
Considering the options available to individuals for engaging in politics, one important 
question is what motivates any particular act. Traditionally, in the context of established 
democracies, conventional political activities such as voting have been viewed as acts that affirm 
individuals’ allegiance to the political system. Consistent with this view, considerable evidence 
shows a strong correlation between positive attitudes about politics and the political system 
(civic orientations) on one hand and participation in conventional political activities on the other 
(Leighley, 1995; Rosenstone & Hansen, 1993; Finkel, 1985; Verba, Nie, & Kim, 1978). While 
political trust, combined with a strong sense of efficacy, encourage what Gamson and others 
have called “allegiant activity” by way of conventional access to governmental institutions and 
actors, a number of studies have found that mistrust and political dissatisfaction increase 
engagement in unconventional political acts (Gamson, 1968; Muller, 1977; Milbrath & Goel, 
1977). Moreover, the connection between dissatisfaction and unconventional participation 
appears to be particularly pronounced among political and ethnic minorities (Craig & Maggiotto, 
1983; Shingles, 1981). This finding is consistent with the idea that unconventional politics 
provide an outlet for disadvantaged minorities, as well as other groups that lack access to politics 
through conventional channels and are alienated from the established political order (Dalton, 
2006, 62-3). This means that, among immigrants, levels of unconventional participation should 
be higher than levels of conventional participation. 
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In light of these findings, we test several hypotheses below. First, we posit that 
dissatisfaction with the political system should be an important driver of political action among 
immigrants, and we expect it to be a more important determinant of unconventional than 
conventional political participation among foreign-born individuals. Second, if the opinion 
climate functions as part and parcel of a country’s opportunity structures, it should be a valuable 
catalyst for connecting immigrant discontent and unconventional political action. This means 
that we expect the impact of political dissatisfaction on participation to be especially powerful in 
countries that are marked by positive opinion climates vis-à-vis immigrants, particularly with 
respect to less institutionalized political acts. 
Data and Analysis 
Our general model of political action contains two basic elements: individual motivations 
and social context. First, we posit that, to understand immigrant political engagement, we require 
information about individuals’ motivations to participate; second, to understand cross-national 
and cross-regional differences in the levels of immigrant participation, we need to know the 
environment in which immigrants choose to engage in politics. Our model posits that these 
factors interact in shaping political action among immigrants: those who are motivated to express 
political discontent are more likely to do so in environments characterized by a friendlier opinion 
climate towards them. 
We estimate our models using data collected at the level of individuals from the 
European Social Survey (ESS) conducted in 2002-10 (four-round cumulative file). The ESS 
project is known for its high standards of methodological rigor in survey design and cross-
national data collection (Kittilson, 2009).4 This project is also the only set of cross-national 
surveys that include questions about people’s attitudes towards immigrants and immigration, 
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questions designed specifically for foreign-born, as well as standard items measuring political 
participation (it also is the only set of surveys that ask these questions in identical format across a 
range of countries). The relevant survey items were available for 25 European countries: Austria, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia, Slovakia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom.5  
Dependent Variables 
Institutionalized participation in politics is an additive index based on the following three 
activities respondents reported having engaged in during past 12 months: contacted a politician, 
government or local government official, worked in a political party or action group, and worked 
in another organization or association.6 Uninstitutionalized political participation is similarly 
based on whether a respondent reported having signed a petition, taken part in a lawful 
demonstration, and boycotted certain products for political, ethical or environmental reasons (cf. 
de Rooij, 2011). Both indexes yield scales ranging from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating 
more political engagement.  
The descriptive statistics show that while the overall levels of political participation 
among foreigners are low, they are not very different from participation levels among natives. As 
expected, immigrants are more likely to engage in uninstitutionalized than in institutionalized 
political acts: the average scores among foreigners are .42 and .24, respectively.7 Looking at the 
underlying distribution of reported acts, 81.3% of foreign-born reported that they had not 
engaged in a single institutionalized act, while 18.7% said they participated in at least one. 
Similarly, about 71% of foreign-born respondents said they had not engaged in any 
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uninstitutionalized acts, 19% indicated they had participated in one, and 2.3% reported that they 
been involved in all reported unconventional activities.  
Independent Variables 
Opinion Climates 
Our key independent variable – the opinion climate towards immigrants – is based on three 
survey questions (cf. Schneider, 2008). Respondents were asked whether immigration was bad or 
good for their country’s economy, whether immigrants undermined or enriched the country’s 
cultural life, and whether immigrants made the country a worse or better place to live. Using 
answers to these questions measured on a scale from 0 to 10, we first calculated an average score 
for each respondent,8 and this score was then used to compute a country mean among natives 
(calculated for each ESS round). To be able to generalize beyond the national level indicator, we 
also calculated a regional measure of opinion climate towards immigrants.9 
Figure 1 shows the average levels of national openness towards immigrants in 25 
European countries. Theoretically the scale ranges from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating 
more favorable opinion climates towards immigrants. We find that the numbers in our sample of 
European countries range from 3.37 in Greece to 6.12 in Sweden, with an average value of 5.02. 
New democracies – Hungary, the Czech Republic, and Estonia – exhibit more anti-immigrant 
climates than other countries, but they are not much behind the UK, Portugal, and Italy. At the 
upper end of the distribution we find some Scandinavian countries, such as Finland and Sweden, 
but also Poland and Bulgaria.  
[Figure 1 about here] 
Foreign-born 
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To identify foreigners in the ESS data, we relied on the survey question: “Were you born in this 
country?” Respondents who did not give a positive response were coded as foreign-born. Pooling 
data across countries generates a sample of 11,985 foreign-born individuals (7.34% of all survey 
respondents).10 Because our individual-level these analyses are based on samples of foreign-born 
respondents only, we sought to establish to what extent these samples matched the characteristics 
of the populations under investigation by conducting several analyses. First, we calculated the 
percentages of foreigners in the survey sample and compared these to data measuring the actual 
percentages of foreigners collected by the European Union’s statistical agency, Eurostat.11 The 
Pearson correlation between the two measures was .97, indicating an extremely close fit between 
survey and official statistics. Second, using a question indicating respondents’ country of origin, 
we investigated the extent to which our samples of foreign-born were representative of 
populations in the countries under investigation by calculating the percentages of individuals 
from different regions of the world: Africa, Asia, the Balkans, East Central Europe, Latin 
America, the Middle East, North America, Australia and New Zealand, and Western Europe. The 
Pearson correlation was .90, indicating yet again a very close fit between survey and official 
statistics.12  
Political Dissatisfaction 
To measure immigrants’ political grievances, we relied on the following survey question: “On 
the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in [country]?” To facilitate the 
interpretation of our results, we reversed the original survey scale, ranging from 0 to 10, so that 
higher values indicate higher levels of dissatisfaction with democracy. Using Easton’s 
categories, this indicator has been validated as a measure of support for the performance of the 
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political regime, rather than support for democracy as an ideal (cf. Klingemann, 1999; Linde & 
Ekman, 2003; Norris, 1999). 
Control Variables  
Our multivariate analyses include a range of control variables past research has identified as 
consistent determinants of political engagement. At the level of individuals, we include a 
standard set of demographic variables (age, gender, marital status) as well as measures of 
people’s socio-economic resources and status (income, education, and employment). We also 
control for social connectedness, union membership, political interest, as well as experiences of 
discrimination and crime. To capture immigrant specific experiences, we used democracy level 
in the respondent’s country of origin, duration of stay in the host country, and citizenship status. 
At the macro-level, we control for a country’s economic prosperity and growth, the size of 
foreign-born population, participation levels among natives, and democratic experience. Finally, 
since we rely on a four-wave cumulative data, we include fixed effects for ESS rounds. Details 
on coding procedures for all variables are listed in the appendix. 
Estimation and Results 
Because our analysis requires that we combine information collected at the level of 
individuals and countries, our dataset has a multi-level structure (where one level, the individual, 
is nested within the other, the country). To avoid a number of statistical problems associated with 
such a data structure (clustering, non-constant variance, underestimation of standard errors, etc.) 
(cf. Snijders & Bosker, 1999; Steenbergen & Jones, 2002), we rely on multi-level models. Since 
our lower unit of analysis (foreigner) is nested within two macro-level units of analysis (foreigner’s host 
country and country of origin), we estimated our multi-level models with crossed random intercepts. 
Table 1 reports the results for institutionalized and uninstitutionalized political acts 
among foreign-born. The analyses reveal that foreigners who are dissatisfied with democracy 
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and enjoy a more favorable opinion climate are more likely to engage in politics. The results are 
consistent using both regional and national measures of opinion climates, but the impact is 
limited to uninstitutionalized political action.  In other words, institutionalized political acts do 
not appear to be driven by a country’s political climate toward migrants.13 14 
[Table 1 about here] 
 To assess how much opinion climates and dissatisfaction with democracy contribute to 
immigrant political participation in substantive terms, Figures 2a and 2b plot the marginal effects 
for uninstitutionalized participation, using national and regional measures of opinion climates. 
The black bars indicate the levels of uninstitutionalized acts among foreigners who are 
completely dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their host country, the white bars – 
participation among foreigners who are fully satisfied, when we compare countries with low and 
high levels of pro-immigrant opinion climate (calculated as 1SD below and above the mean); the 
vertical lines mark the 95% confidence intervals.15 
The results using the national opinion climate measure reveal that the uninstitutionalized 
participation score of a foreigner who is extremely dissatisfied with democracy and resides in 
country with a relatively friendly opinion climate towards migrants is .255 higher than the 
participation score of an individual who lives in a similarly friendly environment but has no 
political grievances (.403 vs. .148). Moreover, a foreigner who is politically dissatisfied and 
resides in a country with pro-immigrant opinion climate is more politically engaged than a 
similarly dissatisfied foreigner living in a hostile climate: the respective scores are .403 vs. .315. 
The pattern is even more pronounced when we consider the results with the regional opinion 
climate measure: the scores of uninstitutionalized political action among foreigners increase 
from .187 to .444 when we compare respondents with the lowest and highest levels of political 
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grievances in regions with favorable opinion climates towards immigrants, while this difference 
is reduced to .121 among foreigners living in regions that are relatively unwelcoming to 
immigrants. Taken together, our results suggest that the opinion climate towards immigrants has 
an important mobilizing effect on uninstitutionalized political action among foreigners with 
political grievances, and this effect operates both at the level of countries and regions in 
European democracies.  
 [Figures 2a and 2b about here] 
Robustness Checks: An Instrumental Variable Approach 
One difficulty with estimating the effects of opinion climates on immigrant political 
engagement is that opinion climates might change as a result of immigrant political action, 
creating an endogeneity problem. Moreover, the relationship between the opinion climate and 
immigrant political action might be spurious, if some unobserved heterogeneity not captured by 
our data is driving both variables. To test the robustness of our findings, and hence to ensure that 
our results are not affected by endogeneity or omitted variable bias, we rely on a two-stage 
instrumental variable (IV) approach (Wooldridge, 2009, Ch. 15; Baum, 2006, Ch 8). The IV 
approach works under the assumption that valid instruments can be identified. This means that 
instruments must have a significant partial correlation with opinion climate, controlling for all 
the other determinants of political participation, while being uncorrelated with the error term in 
the model of political participation. 
We argue that unemployment levels and immigrant integration policies can be used as 
such instruments. Threat in labor market competition has been long thought to be a prime 
motivator behind anti-immigration attitudes (Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Fetzer, 2000; Money, 
1999). We therefore include a percentage of unemployed to predict levels of pro-immigrant 
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opinion climate, with an expectation that higher unemployment in an immigrant receiving 
country engenders more hostility towards newcomers than low unemployment.  
Existing research also shows that immigrant integration laws – most notably, citizenship 
policies – play an important role in shaping majority populations’ attitudes towards ethnic 
minorities and migrants (Weldon, 2006). And while the relationship between institutions and 
opinion climate may not be unidirectional, existing evidence suggests that the main causal 
pathway runs from institutions to people’s opinions about immigrants: state policy regimes 
communicate to majority populations values and norms regarding the position and expected 
behavior of migrants in their host society, and people tend to acquire these values through a 
process of socialization in the family, education system, workplace, and the media (Weldon, 
2006).16 We employ two measures of policy regimes: the Citizenship Policy Index (Howard, 
2009) and the Migrant Integration Policy Index (MIPEX), with an expectation that more liberal 
laws are positively linked to natives’ opinion towards immigrants.  
The first stage of the IV estimation predicts opinion climates towards immigrants using 
our instruments while controlling for all variables specified in the model of political participation 
among foreign-born. Since the IV approach does not allow for multi-level modeling, we include 
fixed effects for countries and ESS rounds, and estimate our models using robust standard errors 
(Arceneaux & Nickerson, 2009). The second stage then employs the instrumented opinion 
climate as an independent variable in the models of political participation among foreign-born.17 
Since opinion climate is hypothesized to interact with dissatisfaction with democracy in 
shaping immigrant political action, we had to make one additional modification to our model. 
Both stages in the IV models are estimated simultaneously, preventing us from generating a 
multiplicative term with instrumented opinion climate produced between the two stages. An 
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alternative way of dealing with independent variables that are hypothesized to have an 
interactive effect with another independent variable is to stratify the sample into two subsamples 
(Hanushek & Jackson, 1977: 101; Jusko & Shiveley, 2005). We therefore split our sample 
between foreigners who are satisfied with the way democracy works in their host country and 
those who are not, using the median value of this variable among foreign-born to ensure that 
both samples are of similar size.18 If our hypothesis of the interactive effect is correct, we should 
observe a positive and statistically significant effect of opinion climates on political participation 
among politically dissatisfied foreigners, especially with respect to uninstitutionalized political 
acts, and a smaller or insignificant effect among those who are satisfied with the political system. 
The first stage of the IV estimations, reported in Table 2, indicates that all instruments 
have the anticipated signs and are significantly correlated with pro-immigrant opinion climates. 
We find that, controlling for all predictors of immigrant political participation as well as country 
and survey fixed effects, liberal immigrant integration policies contribute positively to a pro-
immigrant opinion climate while unemployment undermines it. To systematically assess the 
validity of our instruments, we rely on several test statistics.19 First, the F-statistic for the test of 
excluded instruments is equal to 1,924.7 in the model with national opinion climate, and 211.1 – 
with regional opinion climate, and both are statistically significant at less than .001, indicating 
that our instruments are jointly significant. Furthermore, the Hansen J-test statistic in the models 
reported in Table 3 is statistically insignificant, showing that the instruments are appropriately 
uncorrelated with the error term in the second-stage estimations. Taken together, the results 
indicate that the selected instruments are relevant and statistically independent from the 
disturbance process, satisfying the key requirements of valid instruments of the IV approach.  
[Tables 2 and 3 about here] 
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The results of the second stage estimations, shown in Table 3, are in line with the multi-
level results reported above. As before, we find that pro-immigrant opinion climates have a 
positive effect on immigrant political participation, but this effect is more pronounced among 
foreigners who are dissatisfied with the way democracy works in their host country. However, as 
before, we find that the impact of opinion climates is limited to uninstitutionalized political acts. 
Finally, the results are consistent using national and regional measures of opinion climates, 
although the regional effect is slightly stronger than the national one. Taken together, the IV 
results confirm that the opinion climate towards immigrants has a genuine and robust effect on 
political action among foreigners.  
Discussion 
To better understand the consequences that a society’s opinions about immigrants have 
on the patterns of immigrants’ political engagement in European democracies, our paper focused 
on several important but unanswered questions in previous research: does political engagement 
among the foreign-born depend on the opinion climate toward immigrants in their host country? 
Does the degree of hostility or hospitality affect the kinds of political acts immigrants engage in? 
And, finally, does the opinion climate shape the extent to which political grievances translate 
into political engagement among foreign-born? 
We argue that a more comprehensive explanation of political engagement among 
immigrants requires not only the consideration of information about individual attributes, 
experiences, and attitudes or formal political institutions, rules, and political allies, but also 
taking into account the social context in which immigrants engage politically. As such, this study 
builds on a growing body of literature that seeks to develop multilevel models of political 
behavior designed to systematically incorporate information about individuals and the context 
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they are exposed to (Anderson, 2007) and contributes to it by focusing on informal, rather than 
formal constraints on political action. We argue that positive opinion climates towards 
immigrants – both at the national and regional level – increase the willingness of foreigners to 
engage in uninstitutionalized political acts. Moreover, we find that the effect of opinion climates 
on uninstitutionalized participation is particularly pronounced among immigrants dissatisfied 
with the political system’s performance in their country of residence.  
The conclusion that a friendly environment fosters the translation of immigrants’ political 
discontent into political action is limited to uninstitutionalized political acts.  It also may not be 
congenial to everyone. But recall that the kinds of political acts analyzed here are legal and non-
violent. When aggrieved, immigrants appear to channel their frustrations into nonviolent, albeit 
uninstitutionalized political action, particularly in countries with majority populations who hold 
more positive opinions about immigrants. At a minimum, these results indicate that there is good 
reason to believe that a hospitable environment can counteract immigrants’ political grievances 
from going unexpressed, and this may ultimately prevent more violent expressions of such 
sentiments.  
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Appendix. Measures and Coding 
 
Institutionalized political action. Additive index of three survey items: “There are different ways of trying 
to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, have 
you done any of the following? 1) Contacted a politician, government or local government official, 2) 
Worked in a political party or action group? 3) Worked in another organization or association?” The 
resulting ordinal variable ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values indicating more involvement in 
institutionalized political acts. 
Uninstitutionalized political action. Additive index of three survey items: “There are different ways of 
trying to improve things in [country] or help prevent things from going wrong. During the last 12 months, 
have you done any of the following? 1) Signed a petition? 2) Taken part in a lawful public demonstration? 
3) Boycotted certain products?” The resulting ordinal variable ranges from 0 to 3, with higher values 
indicating more involvement in uninstitutionalized political acts.  
National opinion climate towards immigrants. Country mean of three survey questions: 1) “Would you 
say it is generally bad or good for [country’s] economy that people come to live here from other 
countries?” 2) “Would you say that [country’s] cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by 
people coming to live here from other countries? 3) “Is [country] made a worse or a better place to live by 
people coming to live here from other countries?” (Each item ranges from 0 ‘most anti-immigrant 
attitude’ to 10 ‘most pro-immigrant’ attitude.) We first calculated an average based on these three items 
for each respondent; this individual average was then used to calculate the country mean (for each ESS 
round) among natives.  
Regional opinion climate towards immigrants. Mean calculated as above, only at a regional level using 
ESS region variables (in each country and ESS round).  
Dissatisfaction with democracy. “And on the whole, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works 
in [country]?” 0 ‘extremely satisfied’, 10 ‘extremely dissatisfied’. 
Citizen. “Are you a citizen of [country]?” 1‘yes’, 0 ‘otherwise’. 
Discriminated against. “Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated 
against in this country?” 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’. 
Crime victim. “Have you or a member of your household been the victim of a burglary or assault in the 
last 5 years?” 1 ‘yes’, 0 ‘no’. 
Recent immigrant. “How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?” 5 ‘within last year’, 4 ‘1-5 
years ago’, 3 ‘6-10 years ago’, 2 ‘11-20 years ago’, 1 ‘more than 20 years ago’. 
Democracy in country of origin. Based on survey questions: “Were you born in [country]?” If a 
respondent said “no”, then the follow up question was “In which country were you born?” and “How long 
ago did you first come to live in [country]?” Information about immigrant country of origin and the 
recency of immigrant arrival were then matched up with the polity scores from the Polity IV data set 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/polity/. Since recency of immigrant arrival is a categorical variable that 
captures only approximate number of years in host country, the variable was calculated in the following 
way: if a survey was conducted in 2002, then those who arrived more than 20 years ago were assigned the 
average value of the 1972-1981 polity score in their country of origin, those who arrived 11-20 years ago 
the 1982-1991 score, those who arrived 6-10 years ago the 1992-1996 score, those who arrived 1-5 years 
ago the 1997-2001 score, and those who arrived within the last year – the 2002 score. We then calculated 
values separately for respondents interviewed in 2003, 2004, etc. This resulting variable ranges from 0 
‘least democratic regime’ to 20 ‘most democratic regime’ (recoded from the original polity measure that 
ranges from -10 to 10).  
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Political interest. “How interested would you say you are in politics?” 0 ‘not at all interested’, 1 ‘hardly 
interested’, 2 ‘quite interested’, 3 ’very interested’.  
Married. 1 ‘married’, 0 ‘otherwise’. 
Male. 1‘male’, 0 ‘female’.  
Age. Number of years, calculated by subtracting respondent’s year of birth from the year of interview.  
Income. “Which of the descriptions on this card comes closest to how you feel about your household’s 
income nowadays?” 0 ‘very difficult on present income’, 1 ‘difficult on present income’, 2 ‘coping on 
present income’, 3 ‘living comfortably on present income’. 
Education. The highest level of education achieved.  
Social connectedness. “How often do you meet socially with friends, relatives or work colleagues?” 1 
‘never’, 2 ‘less than once a month’, 3 ‘once a month’, 4 ‘several times a month’, 5 ‘once a week’, 6 
‘several times a week’, 7 ‘every day’.  
Unemployed. Based on two survey questions: “Which of these descriptions applies to what you have been 
doing for the last 7 days? 1) unemployed and actively looking for a job; 2) unemployed, wanting a job but 
not actively looking for a job. Dichotomous variable, coded as 1 if a respondent gave a positive answer to 
at least one question, 0 – otherwise. 
Union member. “Are you or have you ever been a member of a trade union or similar 
organization?”1’is/was a union member’, 0’never been’.  
GDP per capita. Based on purchasing power parity (PPP) in constant 2005 international dollars (in 
1000’s). Source: World Bank (2011).  
Economic growth. Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita. Source: World Bank (2011).  
% Foreign-born in host country. Source: Eurostat 2001 Census Data.  
Participation level among natives. Country-round mean of institutionalized or uninstitutionalized political 
participation among natives.  
% unemployed in host country. Source: World Bank (2011).  
Citizenship Policy Index.  Source: Howard (2009). Additive index based on whether or not a country 
grants jus soli citizenship, the minimum years of residency required for naturalization, and whether or not 
naturalized immigrants are allowed to hold dual citizenship. The variable ranges from 0 to 6, with higher 
values indicating more liberal citizenship policies. 
MIPEX Index. Migrant Integration Policy Index (http://www.mipex.eu/) based on 148 policy indicators of 
immigrants’ access to political participation, labor market mobility, education, family reunion, long-term 
residence, citizenship, and anti-discrimination protection. The variable ranges from 0 (most restrictive 
immigrant integration policies) to 100 (most inclusive).  
 
  
 
Table1. Multi-level Models of Institutional and Uninstitutional Political Action among Foreign-Born Immigrants in 
25 European Countries, 2002-10. 
 
 
 
 
Independent Variables  
With National Pro-immigrant  
Opinion Climate 
With Regional Pro-immigrant  
Opinion Climate 
Institutionalized 
Action  
Uninstitutionalized 
Action  
Institutionalized 
Action 
Uninstitutionalized 
Action 
Pro-immigrant opinion climate  -.046† (.026) -.028 (.028) -.048** (.018) .045† (.023) 
Dissatisfaction with democracy -.018 (.018) -.028 (.022) -.011 (.017) -.027 (.021) 
Pro-immigrant opinion climate 
*Dissatisfaction with democracy 
.005 (.003) .009* (.004) .003 (.003) .009* (.004) 
Citizenship status .042** (.014) .051** (.017) .043*** (.013) .051** (.017) 
Discriminated against .048** (.016) .103*** (.020) .048** (.016) .100*** (.020) 
Crime victim .094*** (.014) .163*** (.018) .096*** (.014) .160*** (.018) 
Recent immigrant -.040*** (.007) -.067*** (.009) -.039*** (.007) -.068*** (.009) 
Democracy in origin country .000 (.001) .003† (.002) .000 (.001) .003† (.002) 
Political interest  .109*** (.006) .138*** (.008) .109*** (.006) .138*** (.008) 
Married .006 (.012) -.070*** (.015) .005 (.012) -.067*** (.015) 
Male .015 (.012) -.045** (.014) .016 (.012) -.046** (.014) 
Age .002 (.002) .006* (.003) .002 (.002) .005* (.002) 
Age squared -.000 (.000) -.000*** (.000) -.000 (.000) -.000*** (.000) 
Income -.007 (.007) .004 (.009) -.006 (.007) .006 (.009) 
Education  .051*** (.005) .059*** (.006) .052*** (.005) .058*** (.006) 
Social connectedness .023*** (.004) .028*** (.005) .022*** (.004) .027*** (.005) 
Unemployed -.012 (.022) -.070* (.027) -.015 (.022) -.066* (.027) 
Union member .064*** (.014) .116*** (.017) .066*** (.014) .116*** (.017) 
GDP per capita  .004 (.002) .001 (.002) .004† (.002) -.002 (.002) 
Economic growth  .002 (.002) .002 (.003) .002 (.002) .003 (.003) 
% Foreign-born  -.326 (.224) -.274 (.206) -.320 (.224) -.213 (.248) 
Participation level among natives .254* (.107) .547*** (.071) .245* (.108) .491*** (.085) 
New democracy -.005 (.050) -.061 (.050) -.005 (.049) -.109† (.056) 
ESS round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -.139 (.135) -.300* (.148) -.134 (.115) -.575*** (.139) 
SD of random intercept: host country .051 (.012) .031 (.014) .051 (.012) .050 (.019) 
SD of random intercept: origin country .047 (.010) .113 (.014) .047 (.010) .109 (.014) 
SD of residuals .541 (.004) .675 (.005) .540 (.004) .673 (.005) 
Number of observations 9,344 9,327 9,326 9,308 
Wald X2 (df) 909.67(26)*** 1,361.14(26)*** 921.55(26)*** 1,307.32(26)*** 
Note:  Results are multi-level linear regression (crossed random intercept) estimates (using STATA’s xtmixed command).  
Numbers in parentheses represent standard errors; y: p < .1, *: p < .05, **: p < .01, ***: p < .001 (two-tailed).
  
 
Table 2. Predicting Pro-immigrant Opinion Climate towards Immigrants in 25 European 
Countries, 2002-10. 
 
 
Independent variables  
With National Pro-immigrant 
Opinion Climate 
With Regional Pro-immigrant 
Opinion Climate 
% unemployed in host country -.036*** 
(.002) 
-.036*** 
(.001) 
-.029*** 
(.002) 
-.029*** 
(.002) 
Citizenship policy index  .128*** 
(.002) 
- .125** 
(.007) 
- 
MIPEX index - .022*** 
(.000) 
- .022*** 
(001) 
Included exogenous individual-level regressors Yes Yes 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes 
ESS round fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of countries 25 25 
Partial R-squared for excluded instruments .29 .06 
F-statistic for test of excluded instruments 1,924.7 211.1 
F p-value .000 .000 
Note: The results are 2SLS first-stage coefficient estimates and their robust standard errors (in parentheses): 
 *p<.05, **p<.01, ***p<.001. 
 
  
  
Table 3. Instrumental Variable Estimates of Institutionalized and Uninstitutionalized Political Action among 
Foreign-Born Immigrants in 25 European Countries, 2002-10. 
 
 
 
Independent Variables  
Institutionalized Action   Uninstitutionalized Action 
Satisfied with 
Democracy 
Dissatisfied with 
Democracy 
Satisfied with 
Democracy 
Dissatisfied with 
Democracy 
National pro-immigrant 
opinion climate (instrumented) 
.104 
(.064) 
- -.108 
(.165) 
- .266*** 
(.083) 
- .535** 
(.194) 
- 
Regional pro-immigrant 
opinion climate (instrumented) 
- .107 
(.067) 
- -.156 
(.200) 
- .281*** 
(.085) 
- .610** 
(.232) 
Citizenship status .038* 
(.017) 
.038* 
(.018) 
.050* 
(.022) 
.049* 
(.022) 
.055* 
(.022) 
.053* 
(.022) 
.031 
(.028) 
.037 
(.029) 
Discriminated against .027 
(.023) 
.021 
(.023) 
.084*** 
(.025) 
.086*** 
(.025) 
.095*** 
(.028) 
.087** 
(.028) 
.106*** 
(.030) 
.094** 
(.031) 
Crime victim .079*** 
(.021) 
.075*** 
(.021) 
.109*** 
(.025) 
.113*** 
(.026) 
.211*** 
(.026) 
.198*** 
(.027) 
.098*** 
(.030) 
.081* 
(.032) 
Recent immigrant -.045*** 
(.008) 
-.045*** 
(.008) 
-.037*** 
(.011) 
-.034** 
(.011) 
-.080*** 
(.011) 
-.080*** 
(.011) 
-.067*** 
(.015) 
-.074*** 
(.015) 
Democracy in origin country .001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.002) 
.001 
(.002) 
.006*** 
(.001) 
.005*** 
(.001) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
.008*** 
(.002) 
Political interest  .114*** 
(.009) 
.113*** 
(.009) 
.107*** 
(.011) 
.108*** 
(.011) 
.123*** 
(.010) 
.122*** 
(.010) 
.174*** 
(.013) 
.173*** 
(.014) 
Married .029† 
(.016) 
.033* 
(.016) 
-.026 
(.020) 
-.030 
(.021) 
-.079*** 
(.020) 
-.071*** 
(.021) 
-.079** 
(.025) 
-.070** 
(.027) 
Male .019 
(.015) 
.021 
(.015) 
.010 
(.018) 
.009 
(.018) 
-.049** 
(.019) 
-.049** 
(.019) 
-.042† 
(.023) 
-.042† 
(.024) 
Age .001 
(.002) 
-.000 
(.002) 
.005 
(.003) 
.005 
(.003) 
.008** 
(.003) 
.008* 
(.003) 
.004 
(.004) 
.003 
(.004) 
Age squared -.000 
(.000) 
.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000*** 
(.000) 
-.000*** 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
-.000 
(.000) 
Income -.007 
(.010) 
-.005 
(.010) 
-.005 
(.013) 
-.007 
(.013) 
.003 
(.012) 
.008 
(.012) 
.005 
(.016) 
.013 
(.016) 
Education  .045*** 
(.006) 
.044*** 
(.006) 
.065*** 
(.008) 
.066*** 
(.008) 
.067*** 
(.007) 
.061*** 
(.007) 
.066*** 
(.010) 
.060*** 
(.010) 
Social connectedness .027*** 
(.005) 
.027*** 
(.005) 
.016** 
(.006) 
.016** 
(.006) 
.028*** 
(.006) 
.027*** 
(.006) 
.025*** 
(.007) 
.024*** 
(.007) 
Unemployed -.005 
(.031) 
-.007 
(.031) 
-.024 
(.030) 
-.027 
(.030) 
-.082* 
(.034) 
-.071* 
(.035) 
-.061 
(.041) 
-.042 
(.043) 
Union member .078*** 
(.020) 
.079*** 
(.020) 
.047† 
(.025) 
.044† 
(.025) 
.105*** 
(.024) 
.101*** 
(.024) 
.142*** 
(.030) 
.153*** 
(.031) 
Country fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
ESS round fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -.776* 
(.391) 
-.788* 
(.400) 
.430 
(1.007) 
.715 
(1.211) 
-1.607*** 
(.502) 
-1.688*** 
(.511) 
-3.227** 
(1.170) 
-3.669** 
(1.392) 
Number of observations 5,742 5,726 3,602 3,600 5,733 5,716 3,594 3,592 
Underidentification test 
(Kleibergen-Paap rk LM 
statistic) 
649.8*** 271.0*** 166.7*** 
 
43.1*** 648.0*** 270.9*** 166.3*** 43.7*** 
Hansen J-statistic .601 .506 2.302 2.241 4.881 4.289 .006 .350 
X2 (1) p-value .438 .477 .129 .134 .027 .038 .938 .554 
Note: The results are 2SLS second-stage coefficient estimates and their robust standard errors (in parentheses): †p<.10, *p<.05, **p<.01, 
***p<.001. Pro-immigrant opinion climate is instrumented using % unemployed and the Citizenship Policy Index (CPI) (Howard 2009) 
in a host country’s population.  
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Figure 2a. Marginal Effects of National Pro-Immigrant Opinion Climate and Satisfaction 
with Democracy Among Foreigners on their Uninstitutionalized Political Action. 
 
Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals  
 
Figure 2b. Marginal Effects of Regional Pro-Immigrant Opinion Climate and Satisfaction 
with Democracy Among Foreigners on their Uninstitutionalized Political Action. 
 
Note: Vertical lines indicate 95% confidence intervals  
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Notes 
                                               
1 Because political engagement can be considered both an individual act – individuals cast 
ballots – as well as a social one – individuals protest together – it is useful to think of both 
individual and contextual variables that may shape participation. 
2 While grievances are known to be a necessary condition for protest (McAdam, McCarthy, & 
Zald, 1996), they are not sufficient: only a small proportion of the people holding those 
grievances usually participate in a movement, as participation tends to be conditioned by 
individual characteristics (Dalton, 2006; McAdam, 1988), movements’ nature, and political 
environment (McAdam, 1982; Meyer, 2006).  
3 Goldstone and Tilly (2001) suggest defining ‘opportunity’ as the probability that social protest 
actions will lead to success in achieving desired outcome. In contrast, ’threat’ is best 
conceptualized as the costs that a social group will incur from protest, or that it expects to suffer 
if it does not take action (183).  
4 It is based on hour-long face-to-face interviews using survey questions designed for optimal 
cross-national comparability and strict random sampling of individuals aged 15 or older 
regardless of nationality, citizenship, language, or legal status to ensure representativeness of 
national populations. 
5 Israel, Russia, Turkey, and Ukraine were excluded because of missing values on the immigrant 
integration policy variables.  
6 Voting is not included because many foreign-born are not citizens and therefore do not have a 
legal right to vote in national elections. 
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7 The respective scores for natives are .45 and .34. Hence, uninstitutionalized participation is 
higher than institutionalized political acts among both natives and foreigners, but the gap in the 
levels of these activities is higher among foreigners than among natives.  
8 Cronbach’s alpha for the scale is .84.  
9 Our measure of opinion climate towards immigrants can be seen as an ‘objective’ measure in a 
sense that it is based on natives' attitudes, rather than immigrants’ perceptions of those attitudes. 
We recognize that a more direct ‘subjective’ measure of opinion climate would be more 
appropriate for our analyses. Unfortunately, such measure is not available in the ESS data, and 
we are not aware of any other survey that includes it.  
10 Foreign-born with both native-born parents were excluded from the analyses, although 
including them does not affect our findings.   
11 We relied on the 2001 Census data, and compared it to the most proximate round of surveys – 
ESS1 collected in 2002-3.  
12 We are not the first to rely on the samples of foreign-born to study immigrant behavior: see, 
for example, Wright & Bloemraad (2012), de Rooij (2011), Maxwell (2010).  
13 To test the robustness of our findings, we re-estimated our models using 1) opinion climate 
based on natives without second generation immigrants; and 2) overall measure of openness 
towards immigrants based on the attitudes of both natives and foreigners (results available upon 
request). Using these alternative measures of opinion climate does not change our findings 
appreciably and our inferences remain the same.  
14 It is worth noting that this contrasts with the patterns of political engagement among natives 
among whom negative attitudes toward government go hand in hand with political 
disengagement. In our dataset, too, dissatisfaction with democracy is negatively correlated with 
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both institutionalized and uninstitutionalized political action among natives (-.1 for 
institutionalized and -.07 for uninstitutionalized engagement).  
15We hold other variables at their means and dichotomous variables – at their medians. 
16Wright (2011) makes a similar argument when analyzing the consequences of liberal 
citizenship laws and welfare state on the conceptions of inclusive conceptions of national 
identity (see also Kesler & Bloemraad (2010)). 
17The inclusion of country fixed effects requires that we drop substantive macro-level controls 
previously used in multi-level models due to collinearity.  
18The median value is 4 on a scale from 0 to 10, with higher values indicating a more dissatisfied 
response) 
19 For a similar approach, see Gabel & Scheve (2007).  
